Innovation and entrepreneurship pdf download

Over time, the public sector too has begun to be perceived not only as an entity that creates economic regulations, but also as a real partner in the process of shaping economic development: it provides innovative projects, which are then commercialised in business. Therefore, the role of the public sector is not only to legislate, but also to conduct joint actions with the innovative business sector in order to stimulate local development of innovative projects.

This publication will address the so-called triple helix the most effective process of generating innovation : the system of co-operation between business, science, and government that contributes to the creation of innovative economy. Author : Donald F. Kuratko,Michael H. Morris,Jeffrey G. Built on years of research and experience, the book employs a clear and informative how-to approach and features sections and chapters organized according to a summary model of the corporate entrepreneurship process.

This groundbreaking book fulfills a real business need, because many executives consider entrepreneurial behavior a key to sustaining their companies' competitive advantage, but few possess genuine knowledge of the subject or understand how to apply it. But are the links between innovation and entrepreneurship as inextricable as we think?

From Innovation to Entrepreneurship questions this seemingly interdependent relationship, highlighting the different requirements of innovation and entrepreneurship.

This book disentangles theories of innovation and entrepreneurship, empirically revealing the overlaps and differences between them. Demonstrating that the pursuit of entrepreneurship is the key to economic development, Yasuyuki Motoyama explores the concept that people are at the heart of entrepreneurship ecosystems.

But nobody expects it to sell; in fact, nobody wants it to sell. Everybody is likely to react precisely the way the chairman of R. Macy reacted when he saw the unwanted and unloved appliances over- take his beloved fashions, on which he himself had spent his working life and his energy. Managements are paid for their judgment, but they are not being paid to be infallible. In fact, they are being paid to realize and admit that they have been wrong— especially when their admission opens up an opportunity.

But this is by no means common. A Swiss pharmaceutical company today has world leadership in veterinary medicines, yet it has not itself developed a single veteri- nary drug.

But the companies that developed these medicines refused to serve the veterinary market. The medicines, mostly antibiotics, were of course developed for treating human diseases. When the veterinarians discovered that they were just as effective for animals and began to send in their orders, the original manufac- turers were far from pleased.

In some cases they refused to supply the veterinarians; in many others, they disliked having to reformu- late the drugs for animal use, to repackage them, and so on. Some of the manufacturers were only too happy to get rid of the embarrassing success. Human medications have since come under price pressure and are carefully scrutinized by regulatory authorities. This has made veteri- nary medications the most profitable segment of the pharmaceutical industry.

But the companies that developed the compounds in the first place are not the ones who get these profits. Nobody pays any attention to it.

Hence, nobody exploits it, with the inevitable result that the competitor runs with it and reaps the rewards. A leading hospital supplier introduced a new line of instruments for biological and clinical tests. The new products were doing quite well. Then, suddenly, orders came in from industrial and university laboratories.

Nobody was told about them, nobody noticed them; nobody realized that, by pure accident, the company had developed products with more and better customers outside the market for which those products had been developed.

No salesman was being sent out to call on these new customers, no service force was being set up. Five or eight years later, another company had taken over these new markets. And because of the volume of business these markets produced, the newcomer could soon invade the hospital market offer- ing lower prices and better services than the original market leader.

Practically every company—but every public-service institution as well—has a monthly or quarterly report. The first sheet lists the areas in which performance is below expectations: it lists the prob- lems and the shortfalls. At the monthly meetings of the management group and the board of directors, everybody therefore focuses on the problem areas. No one even looks at the areas where the company has done better than expected. To exploit the opportunity for innovation offered by unex- pected success requires analysis.

Unexpected success is a symp- tom. But a symptom of what? The underlying phenomenon may be nothing more than a limitation on our own vision, knowledge, and understanding.

The unexpected success of appliances at R. Up until World War II, department store consumers in the United States bought primarily by socioeconomic status, that is, by income group.

The unexpected success of laboratory instruments designed for the hospital in industrial and university laboratories was a symptom of the disappearance of distinctions between the various users of scientific instruments, which for almost a century had created sharply different markets, with different end uses, specifications, and expectations.

What it symptomized—and the company never realized this—was not just that a product line had uses that were not originally envisaged. It sig- naled the end of the specific market niche the company had enjoyed in the hospital market. So the company that for thirty or forty years had successfully defined itself as a designer, maker, and marketer of hospi- tal laboratory equipment was forced eventually to redefine itself as a maker of laboratory instruments, and to develop capabilities to design, manufacture, distribute, and service way beyond its original field.

By then, however, it had lost a large part of the market for good. Thus the unexpected success is not just an opportunity for inno- valion; it demands innovation. It forces us to ask, What basic changes are now appropriate for this organization in the way it defines its busi- ness? Its technology? Its markets? If these questions are faced up to, then the unexpected success is likely to open up the most rewarding and least risky of all innovative opportunities. DuPont, for years, had confined itself to making munitions and explosives.

In the mids it then organized its first research efforts in other areas, one of them the brand-new field of polymer chemistry, which the Germans had pioneered during World War I. Then, in , an assistant left a burner on over the weekend.

On Monday morning, Wallace H. Carothers, the chemist in charge, found that the stuff in the kettle had congealed into fibers. It took another ten years before DuPont found out how to make Nylon intentionally. The point of the story is, how- ever, that the same accident had occurred several times in the labora- tories of the big German chemical companies with the same results, and much earlier.

The Germans were, of course, looking for a poly- merized fiber—and they could have had it, along with world leader- ship in the chemical industry, ten years before DuPont had Nylon. But because they had not planned the experiment, they dismissed its results, poured out the accidentally produced fibers, and started all over again. The history of IBM equally shows what paying attention to the unexpected success can do. For IBM is largely the result of the will- ingness to exploit the unexpected success not once, but twice.

In the early s, IBM almost went under. It had spent its available money on designing the first electro-mechanical bookkeeping machine, meant for banks. But American banks did not buy new equipment in the Depression days of the early thirties. IBM even then had a policy of not laying off people, so it continued to manufacture the machines, which it had to put in storage. Watson of IBM?

Why does your sales manager refuse to demonstrate your machine to me? But next morning, he appeared there as soon as its doors opened.

In those days, libraries had fair amounts of government money. Like the other early American computers, the IBM computer was designed for scientific purposes only. But IBM, though equally surprised by the business demand for computers, responded immediately. Indeed, it was willing to sac- rifice its own computer design, which was not particularly suitable for accounting, and instead use what its rival and competitor Univac had developed.

Within four years IBM had attained leadership in the computer market, even though for another decade its own computers were technically inferior to those produced by Univac. Matsushita was a fairly small and undistinguished company in the early s, outranked on every count by such older and deeply entrenched giants as Toshiba or Hitachi. Matsushita, however, was intelligent enough to accept that the Japanese farmers apparently did not know that they were too poor for television.

What they knew was that television offered them, for the first time, access to a big world. They could not afford televi- sion sets, but they were prepared to buy them anyhow and pay for them. Toshiba and Hitachi made better sets at the time, only they showed them on the Ginza in Tokyo and in the big-city department stores, making it pretty clear that farmers were not particularly wel- come in such elegant surroundings.

Matsushita went to the farmers and sold its televisions door-to-door, something no one in Japan had ever done before for anything more expensive than cotton pants or aprons.

The search has to be organized. It must be properly featured in the information management obtains and studies. How to do this is described in some detail in Chapter Managements must look at every unexpected success with the questions: 1 What would it mean to us if we exploited it?

And 4 How do we go about it? This means, first, that managements need to set aside specific time in which to discuss unexpected successes; and second, that someone should always be designated to analyze an unexpected success and to think through how it could be exploited.

But management also needs to learn what the unexpected success demands of them. Again, this might best be explained by an example. Nobody on the faculty really believed in the program. The only reason it was offered at all was that a small number of returning World War II veterans had been forced to go to work before obtain- ing their undergraduate degrees and were clamoring for an oppor- tunity to get the credits they still lacked.

And the students in the pro- gram actually outperformed the regular undergraduates. This, in turn, created a dilemma. To exploit the unexpected success, the university would have had to build a fairly big first-rate faculty. But this would have weakened its main program; at the least, it would have diverted the university from what it saw as its main mission, the training of undergraduates. The alternative was to close down the new program.

Either decision would have been a responsible one. Instead, the university decided to staff the pro- gram with cheap, temporary faculty, mostly teaching assistants working on their own advanced degrees.

As a result, it destroyed the program within a few years; but worse, it also seriously dam- aged its own reputation. The unexpected success is an opportunity, but it makes demands.

It demands to be staffed with the ablest people available, rather than with whoever we can spare. It demands seriousness and support on the part of management equal to the size of the opportunity. And the opportunity is considerable. But they are seldom seen as symptoms of opportunity. A good many failures are, of course, nothing but mistakes, the results of greed, stupidity, thoughtless bandwagon-climbing, or incompetence whether in design or execution.

Yet if something fails despite being carefully planned, carefully designed, and conscientiously executed, that failure often bespeaks underlying change and, with it, opportunity. The assumptions on which a product or service, its design or its marketing strategy, were based may no longer fit reality. Any change like this is an opportunity for innovation. I had my first experience with an unexpected failure at the very begin- ning of my working life, almost sixty years ago, just out of high school.

My first job was as a trainee in an old export firm, which for more than a century had been selling hardware to British India. Its best seller for years had been a cheap padlock, of which it exported whole shiploads every month. The padlock was flimsy; a pin easily opened the lock.

As incomes in India went up during the s, padlock sales, instead of going up, began to decline quite sharply. But the improved padlock turned out to be unsalable. Four years later, the firm went into liquidation, the decline of its Indian padlock business a major factor in its demise. For the bulk of Indians, the peasants in the villages, the padlock was and for all I know, still is a magical symbol; no thief would have dared open a padlock.

The key was never used, and usual- ly disappeared. To get a padlock that could not easily be opened with- out a key—the improved padlock my employer had worked so hard to perfect without additional cost—was thus not a boon but a disaster.

A small but rapidly growing middle-class minority in the cities, however, needed a real lock. That it was not sturdy enough for their needs was the main reason why the old lock had begun to lose sales and market. But for them the redesigned product was still inadequate.

Both lines immediately began to sell. Within two years, the competitor had become the largest European hardware exporter to India. A quaint tale from horse and buggy days, some might say. Surely we have become more sophisticated in this age of computers, of mar- ket research, and of business school MBAs.

Yet it teaches exactly the same lesson. Inflation was becoming rampant, particularly in housing prices, which rose much faster than anything else. At the same time, interest rates on home mortgages were skyrocketing. The builders tried to salvage it by offering low-interest financing and long repayment terms, and by slashing prices. He found that there had been a change in what the young American couple wants in its first house. To make the down payment on this far more expensive permanent home, they would, however, need the equity they had built up in the first house.

Seniority, for working-class people with Japan being the major exception , means greater job security rather than larger incomes. Once this was understood—and all it took was to listen to prospective homebuyers for a few weekends—successful innovation came about eas- ily. Almost no change was made in the physical plant itself; only the kitchen was redesigned and made somewhat roomier.

Five years later, the firm was operating in seven metropolitan areas and was either number one or a strong number two in each of them. Even during the building recession of —82—a recession so severe that some of the largest American builders did not sell one sin- gle new house during an entire season—this innovative homebuilder continued to grow. It gave us a steady supply of well-built and still fairly new houses that needed only a little fixing up and could then be resold at a very decent profit to the next crop of first-home buyers.

The unexpected failure demands that you go out, look around, and listen. Failure should always be considered a symp- tom of an innovative opportunity, and taken seriously as such. At that time Kroc was selling milkshake machines to hamburger joints. He investigated and found an old man who had, in effect, reinvented the fast-food business by system- atizing it.

In either case, one takes the event seriously as a possible symptom of innovative opportunity. Innovation—and this is a main thesis of this book—is organized, systematic, rational work. But it is perceptual fully as much as con- ceptual. To be sure, what the innovator sees and learns has to be sub- jected to rigorous logical analysis. It is not in fact even necessary for the entrepreneur to understand why reality has changed. In the two cases above, it was easy to find out what had happened and why.

More often, we find out what is hap- pening without much clue as to why. And yet we can still innovate successfully. Even people who were not yet born when the Edsel failed have heard about it, at least in the United States. But the general belief that the Edsel was a slapdash gamble is totally mis- taken.

Very few products were ever more carefully designed, more care- fully introduced, more skillfully marketed. Ford went to extreme lengths to plan and design the Edsel, embodying in its design the best information from market research, the best information about customer preferences in appearance and styling, and the highest standards of quality control. Yet the Edsel became a total failure right away. The reaction of the Ford Motor Company was very revealing.

All we know is that something happened. But that is enough to convert the unexpected, whether success or failure, into an opportunity for effective and purposeful innovation. But outside events, that is, events that are not recorded in the information and the figures by which a management steers its institution, are just as important.

Indeed, they often are more important. Here are some examples showing typical unexpected outside events and their exploitation as major opportunities for successful innovation. One example concerns IBM and the personal computer. Everything else, every IBM engineer could prove convincingly, would be far too expensive, far too confusing, and far too limited in its performance capacity. And so IBM concentrated its efforts and resources on main- taining its leadership in the main-frame market.

Right away their fathers wanted their own office computer or personal computer, that is, a separate, small, freestanding machine with far less capacity than even the smallest main-frame has. All the dire things the IBM people had predicted actually did happen. But this does not seem to bother the customers. On the contrary, in the U. IBM could have been expected to dismiss this development. As a result, IBM produced its own personal computer in , just when the market was exploding.

But is it no less instruc- tive despite its lack of glamour. The United States has never been a book-buying country, in part because of the ubiquitous free public library. But instead of collapsing, book sales in the United States have soared since TV first came in. No one knows why this happened. Indeed, no one quite knows what really happened. Books are still as rare in the typical American home as before. That we have no answer to this question does not alter the fact that books are being bought and paid for in increasing numbers.

Both the publishers and the existing bookstores knew, of course, all along that book sales were soaring. Neither, however, did anything about it. The unexpected event was exploited, instead, by a few mass retailers such as department stores in Minneapolis and Los Angeles. None of these people had ever had anything to do with books, but they knew the retail business. They started bookstore chains that are quite different from any earlier bookstore in America.

Basically, these are supermarkets. They are located in shopping centers with high rents but also with high traffic, whereas everybody in the book business had known all along that a bookstore has to be in a low-rent location, preferably near a universi- ty. The standing joke among them is that any salesperson who wants to read anything besides the price tag on the book is hopelessly overqualified. For ten years now, these new bookstore chains have been among the most successful and fastest-growing segments in American retail- ing and among the fastest-growing new businesses in this country altogether.

Each of these cases represents genuine innovation. But not one of them represents diversification. IBM stayed in the computer business. Companies, even large companies, that went into the new book market This is also true of Japan, the country, that per capita, buys more books than any other and twice as many as the United States. Yet as the above examples show, it also demands innovation in product and often in service and distribution channels.

The second point about these cases is that they all are big-com- pany cases. Of course, a good many of the cases in this book, as in any management book, have to be big-company cases. They are the only available ones, as a rule, the only ones that can be found in the published records, the only ones discussed on the business page of newspapers or in magazines. Small-company cases are much harder to come by and often cannot be discussed without violating confidences. But exploiting the unexpected outside event appears to be some- thing that particularly fits the existing enterprise, and a fairly sizable one at that.

I know of few small companies that have successfully exploited the unexpected outside event; nor does any other student of entrepreneurship and innovation whom I could consult. This may be coincidence.

The large retailer also knows about shopping-center locations and how to get the good ones. And could a small company have done what IBM did and detach four task forces of first-rate designers and engineers to work on new product lines? Smaller high-tech compa- nies in a rapidly growing industry usually do not have enough of such people even for their existing work.

It may well be that the unexpected outside event is the innovative area that offers the large enterprise the greatest opportunity along with the lowest risk. It may be the area that is particularly suited for innovation by the large and established enterprise. It may be the area in which expertise matters the most, and in which the ability to mobi- lize substantial resources fast makes the greatest difference.

But as these cases also show, being big and established does not guarantee that an enterprise will perceive the unexpected event and successfully organize itself to exploit it. Not one of them exploited the personal computer—they were all too busy fighting IBM. The opportunity is there, in other words. It is a major opportunity, occurring frequently. And when it occurs, it holds out great promise, particularly for existing and sizable enterprises.

But such opportuni- ties require more than mere luck or intuition. They demand that the enterprise search for innovation, be organized for it, and be managed so as to exploit it. We may not understand the reason for it; indeed, we often cannot figure it out.

Still, an incongruity is a symptom of an opportu- nity to innovate. Such a fault is an invitation to innovate. It creates an insta- bility in which quite minor efforts can move large masses and bring about a restructuring of the economic or social configuration.

Incongruities do not, however, usually manifest themselves in the fig- ures or reports executives receive and pay attention to. They are qual- itative rather than quantitative. Like the unexpected event, whether success or failure, incongruity is a symptom of change, either change that has already occurred or change that can be made to happen.

Like the changes that underlie the unexpected event, the changes that underlie incongruity are changes within an industry, a market, a process. The incongruity is thus clear- ly visible to the people within or close to the industry, market, or process; it is directly in front of their eyes.

It should be easy to be profitable in an industry with steadily rising demand. The tide carries it. A lack of profitability and results in such an industry bespeaks an incongruity between economic realities. Typically, these incongruities are macro-phenomena, which occur within a whole industry or a whole service sector.

The major oppor- tunities for innovation exist, however, normally for the small and highly focused new enterprise, new process, or new service. And usu- ally the innovator who exploits this incongruity can count on being left alone for a long time before the existing businesses or suppliers wake up to the fact that they have new and dangerous competition. For they are so busy trying to bridge the gap between rising demand and lagging results that they barely even notice somebody is doing something different—something that produces results, that exploits the rising demand.

Sometimes we understand what is going on. But sometimes it is impossible to figure out why rising demand does not result in better performance.

The innovator, therefore, need not always try to under- stand why things do not work as they should. What would convert it into an opportunity? What can be done? Sometimes the action to be taken is rather obvious, even though the problem itself is quite obscure.

And some- times we understand the problem thoroughly and yet cannot figure out what to do about it. For more than fifty years, since the end of World War I, the large, integrated steel mill in developed countries did well only in wartime.

The explanation of this incongruity has long been known. The minimum incremental unit needed to satisfy additional demand in an integrated steel mill is a very big investment and adds substantially to capacity.

Any expansion to an existing steel mill is thus likely to oper- ate for a good many years at a low utilization rate, until demand— which always goes up in small, incremental steps except in wartime—reaches the new capacity level. But not to expand when demand creeps up means losing market share, and permanently. No company can afford to take that risk.

The industry can therefore only be profitable for a few short years: between the time when everybody begins to build new capacity and the time when all this new capacity comes on stream. Further, the steelmaking process invented in the s is funda- mentally uneconomical, as also has been known for many years. It tries to defy the laws of physics—and that means violating the laws of economics. Nothing in physics requires as much work as the cre- ation of temperatures, whether hot or cold, unless it is working against the laws of gravity and of inertia.

The integrated steel process creates very high temperatures four times, only to quench them again. And it lifts heavy masses of hot materials and then moves them over considerable distances. It had been clear for many years that the first innovation in process that would assuage these inherent weaknesses would sub- stantially lower costs. But that is still about one-sixth to one-tenth the minimum economic size of an integrated steel mill. A mini-mill can thus be built to provide, economically, a fairly small additional increment of steel production for which the market already exists.

The mini-mill creates heat only once, and does not quench it, but uses it for the rest of the process. It starts with steel scrap instead of iron ore, and then concentrates on one end product: sheet, for instance, or beams, or rods. And while the integrated steel mill is highly labor-intensive, the mini-mill can be automated.

Its costs thus come to less than half those of the traditional steel process. Governments, labor unions, and the integrated steel companies have been fighting the mini-mill every step of the way.

By the year , fifty percent or more of the steel used in the United States is likely to come out of mini-mills, while the large, integrated steel mills will be in irreversible decline. There is a catch, however, and it is an important one. A similar incongruity between the economic reality of demand and the econom- ic reality of the process exists in the paper industry.

Only in this case, we do not know how to convert it into innovation and opportunity. Despite the constant efforts of the governments of all developed and most developing countries to increase the demand for paper— perhaps the only objective on which the governments of all countries agree—the paper industry has not been doing well.

For eighty or ninety years, it has been known that wood fiber is a monomer; and it should not be too diffi- cult, one would say, to find a plasticizer that converts it into a poly- mer. This would convert paper-making from an inherently inefficient and wasteful mechanical process into an inherently efficient chemical process. Indeed, almost a hundred years ago this was achieved as far as making textile fibers out of wood pulp is concerned—in the rayon process, which dates back to the s.

But despite millions spent in research, nobody has so far found a technique to produce paper that way. In an incongruity, as these cases exemplify, the innovative solution has to be clearly definable. It has to be feasible with the existing, known technology, and with easily available resources. It requires hard developmental work, of course.

In public-service areas, too, major incongruities between econom- ic realities can be found. Health care in developed countries offers one example. As recently as , health care represented an insignificant portion of national expenditure in all developed countries, taking up a good deal less than 1 percent of gross national product or of consumer expenditures. Now, half a century later, health care, and expecially the hospital, accounts in all developed countries for 7 to 11 percent of a much larger gross national product.

Costs have risen much faster than services—perhaps three or four times as fast. The demand will continue to rise with the steady growth in the number of older people in all developed countries over the next thirty years. And so will the costs, which are closely tied to the age of the population.

We do not understand the phenomenon. These innovations are quite different simply because the two countries have such radically different systems. Health insurance policyholders, however, are operated on right away. In contrast to Great Britain, the United States has so far tried to sat- isfy all demands of health care regardless of cost.

As a result, hospital costs in America have exploded. It is given in The Economist of April 29, These new facilities do not substitute for the hospital. What they do in effect is to push the American hospital toward the same role the British have assigned to their hospitals: as a place for emergencies, for life-threatening diseases, and for intensive and acute sickness care.

It is this fact, however, that makes them accessible, visible, and understandable. Above all, these examples show why the incon- gruity between economic realities offers such great innovative oppor- tunities. The people who work within these industries or public serv- ices know that there are basic flaws.

But they are almost forced to ignore them and to concentrate instead on patching here, improving there, fighting this fire or caulking that crack. They are thus unable to take the innovation seriously, let alone to try to compete with it. They do not, as a rule, even notice it until it has grown so big as to encroach on their industry or service, by which time it has become irreversible.

In the meantime, the innovators have the field to themselves. They will concentrate on the area where results do not exist. Then there is an incongruity between real- ity and behavior, an incongruity that once again offers opportunity for successful innovation to whoever can perceive and exploit it. A simple example is that old workhorse of world trade, the ocean- going general cargo vessel. Thirty-five years ago, in the early s, the ocean-going freighter was believed to be dying.

Costs of ocean freight were rising at a fast clip, and it took longer and longer to get merchandise delivered by freighter as one port after another became badly congested.

This, in turn, increased pilferage at the docks as more and more merchandise piled up waiting to be loaded while ves- sels could not make it to the pier.

The basic reason was that the shipping industry had misdirected its efforts toward nonresults for many years. It had tried to design and build faster ships, and ships that required less fuel and a smaller crew. It concentrated on the economics of the ship while at sea and in tran- sit from one port to another.

But a ship is capital equipment; and for all capital equipment the biggest cost is the cost of not working, during which interest has to be paid while the equipment does not earn. Everybody in the indus- try knew, of course, that the main expense of a ship is interest on the investment. Yet the industry kept on concentrating its efforts on costs that were already quite low—the costs of the ship while at sea and doing work.

The solution was simple: Uncouple loading from stowing. Do the loading on land, where there is ample space and where it can be per- formed before the ship is in port, so that all that has to be done is to put on and take off pre-loaded freight. Concentrate, in other words, on the costs of not working rather than on those of working. The answer was the roll-on, roll-off ship and the container ship.

The results of these simple innovations have been startling. Freighter traffic in the last thirty years has increased up to five- fold.

Costs, overall, are down by 60 percent. Port time has been cut by three-quarters in many cases, and with it congestion and pilferage.

Incongruity between perceived reality and actual reality often declares itself. But whenever serious, concentrated efforts do not make things better but, on the contrary, make things worse—where faster ships only mean more port congestion and longer delivery times—it is highly probable that efforts are being misdirected.

In all likelihood, refocusing on where the results are will yield substantial returns easily and fast.

The incongruity between perceived and actual reality typically char- acterizes a whole industry or a whole service area. The solution, how- ever, should again be small and simple, focused and highly specific.

It is also a good example of the incongruity between actual and perceived customer values and cus- tomer expectations. Long before the Japanese industrialist told his American audience that the poor in his country would not buy a TV set because they could not afford it, the poor in the United States and in Europe had already shown that TV satisfies expectations which have little to do with traditional economics.

But they are examples of a common phenomenon. One of the fastest-growing American financial institutions for the last several years has been a securities firm located not in New York but in a suburb of a Midwestern city.

And it owes its success and growth to having exploited an incongruity. Huttons, assume that their customers have the same values they have. To them it is obvious, if not axiomatic, that people invest in order to get rich. The local professional men, the local small businessmen, the local substantial farmers, however, have neither such time nor such knowledge; they are much too busy earning their money to have time to manage it.

This is the incongruity which the Midwestern securities firm exploits. Carousel Previous. Carousel Next. What is Scribd? Explore Ebooks. Bestsellers Editors' Picks All Ebooks. Explore Audiobooks. Bestsellers Editors' Picks All audiobooks. Explore Magazines. Editors' Picks All magazines. Explore Podcasts All podcasts. Difficulty Beginner Intermediate Advanced. Explore Documents. Innovation and Entrepreneurship Peter Drucker.

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